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CONTRACTS AND COMMUNITIES IN CORPORATION
LAW*
WILLiAM T. ALLEN**
Every general field of law embraces materials from which analysis can
unearth the deepest questions that our social life recurringly presents to us.
In some fields of law such questions lie near the surface, barely disguised
by legal terminology and procedure. Most clearly, this is the case with the
field of constitutional law, in which contests between claims of individual
autonomy and claims of community are commonplace.' But it is hardly less
true of criminal law, with its basic questions of culpability and punishment,
or of tort law2 or contract.3 Other fields of law-one thinks of the various
fields of commercial law, of intellectual property, or of taxation-appear
or are more technical, more narrowly "legal." In such fields, legal problems
may. seem less pregnant with potentialities and answers may seem, and
thankfully sometimes are, less controversial. It is easy in such fields to lose
sight of-indeed it may sometimes be difficult to ever catch a first glimpse
of-the contestable philosophical or political presuppositions that lie at their
foundations, buried beneath the legal superstructure. Corporation law is
such a field.
In this short essay I offer, in brief summary, some thoughts about the
controversial philosophical foundations of contemporary corporation law. I
do so in the hope of setting forth a helpful context within which to consider
the dual questions presented by the subject of this symposium: whether a
fundamental change has or is likely to occur in either academic corporation
* These speculations constitute a continuation of informal remarks I made to a small
but distinguished group of Canadian judges, regulators, practitioners and academic lawyers as
a warmly received guest of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law in October 1993. As
then, my thoughts continue very much as work in progress.
** Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery.
1. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1773-75 (1991) (holding that. regulation
tying abortion clinic funding to ban on abortion-related speech does not violate First Amend-
ment); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding state's
ability to prevent parents from terminating life support of comatose daughter); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding, in the face of challenge by putative natural father,
constitutionality of irrebuttable statutory presumption of paternity in mother's husband);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that statute criminalizing sodomy does not
violate Fourteenth Amendment); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d
1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (statute prohibiting peyote possession which excepts Native Americans
in order to preserve their culture does not violate Establishment Clause of First Amendment).
2. E.g., tort rules, such as those defining tort liability among family members, which
address the borders of protected relationships. See 2 FOwLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF
ToRTs § 8.10-.11 (2d ed. 1986).
3. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50, 1253-54 (N.J. 1988) (holding that
constitutional right of procreation does not extend to use of surrogate mother; holding surrogacy
contract void as against public policy).
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law or in the field in practice and, in either event, whether such change is
desirable.
I tentatively and modestly offer these thoughts, recognizing that my
own experience and expertise lie in a more prosaic direction. I am modest
especially because in offering these thoughts I am mindful that I foreshadow
ground more cogently surveyed in this volume by Professors Ronald M.
Green and Alan Wolfe and Dean Karen L. Newman and by their legal
academic commentators.
I.
I begin with the observation that a fundamental (if perhaps primitive)
taxonomy of our intellectual life might perceive two contrasting models of
human action, each bottomed on a different view of what it means to be
a human being in society. Complex and contradictory real life, of course,
cannot be fully captured by either model.
A. The Liberal-Utilitarian Model
The first of the two competing paradigms can be represented as the
classical liberal paradigm. Finding its roots in the work of Hobbes, Locke,
and Smith, and importantly shaped by the work of Bentham and Mill, this
perspective reached full development in the thought of Herbert Spencer.
The classical liberal paradigm describes the social world as populated by
individuals rationally (if sometimes imperfectly so) pursuing their own vision
of the good life. In this model-ideally-legal institutions keep the peace,
define and protect property and contract and ameliorate problems that
individuals cannot effectively resolve through bargaining.
For classical liberals, the law is positivistic and should be utilitarian.
Thus, ideally, the law should be a clear set of rules that facilitate the private
ordering of human affairs. If the law comprised such a set of clear rules,
individuals would have maximum control over their condition, and presum-
ably free bargaining would lead towards better states of the world. An
incidental cost of a system of clear rules will be that attempted transactions
will occasionally fail to domply with the rules and will, as a result, collapse,
causing unexpected disappointment or even injury. That fact is regrettable,
of course, but classical liberals also see it as a necessary cost of a beneficial
system of clear rules. Distribution of gains and losses is a secondary concern
in this model.
Under the liberal-utilitarian model, the law creating and protecting
property rights and the law enforcing contracts is the law of greatest
importance to our welfare. The legal value of the highest rank in this
classical liberal view is, I suppose, human liberty, and the greatest evil is
oppression by the leviathan state.
4
4. It would be an error to equate the liberal-utilitarian model with what today we
popularly call "conservative" or "right" political positions. The liberal-utilitarian model today
has a right-of-center (classical liberal) as well as a left-of-center (left-liberal) variant, just as
the alternative social model, described later in the text, has both a left (communitarian) and
right (moral majority) version.
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B. The Social Model
The classical liberal mind-set found its widest and deepest acceptance
in English and American thought of the nineteenth century. I think of the
contrasting approach as being grounded in the dominant concepts of con-
tinental Europe and a yet earlier age. If, with respect to economic relations,
Spencer is the most complete liberal-utilitarian, Emile Durkheim is the most
important voice of the contrary view. This alternative paradigm describes
the world as populated not by atomistic rational maximizers, but by persons
of limited rationality who lead lives embedded in a social context, in a
community. That context includes traditions from which persons draw
valued ethnic or religious identification. It includes communities or groups
with worked-out moral codes, claiming various degrees of solidarity with
the individual, and it includes affective relationships with others such as
families and neighbors. This alternative paradigm is the social model of
human action.s For those holding this perspective, individual autonomy and
rationality are a part of the truth of human life, but their significance can
easily be exaggerated.
While proponents of the social model of human life would concede
that property and contract law are useful in promoting productive social
life, those holding this perspective see them as partial and assert that their
utility rests in part on presupposition of shared norms including those of
fairness and trust. Those holding this perspective are more willing to regulate
and define the legal institutions of property and contract in service of social
values. For them, for example, legal protections for fallible or disadvantaged
persons, such as limitations upon the enforceability of bargains, are appro-
priate. While the liberal model seeks rules that are clear ex ante in order
to facilitate future transactions, the social model of law can tolerate am-
biguity in rules in order to promote outcomes that, when viewed ex post,
are seen as fair.6 Standards and principles are seen as more useful than
rigid rules.7 Instead of clarity, rules, under this model, may sensibly require
5. See EmIE DuRiEm, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETY (George Simpson trans.,
1933). See also Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate
Enterprise, 92 CoLum. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (book review).
6. In equating the social model with an expost style of judicial review of bargains and
in later extending that equation to equity courts, I do not mean to say that equity or those
who tend towards a social model of interaction exclusively evaluate contracts or promises from
an expost perspective. In the case of equity such a view would be descriptively wrong as well
as ethically difficult to defend. What I do mean to say is that the social model and the legal
institution of equity are much more open than is the liberal model I describe to considering
outcomes as a relevant factor when evaluating or judicially enforcing contracts. In this sense
I associate them with an ex post evaluation style.
7. See GRANT GuaoMRE, THE DEaTH OF CoNaACr (1974) (stating that 20th century
contract law emphasizes reasonable reliance rather than formality as prerequisite for binding
obligation). See also the marvelous inaugural lecture of Professor P. S. Atiyah, as Professor
of English Law, St. John's College, Oxford: From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes In the
Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, reprinted in 65 IowA L. REv. i249 (1980). But
see P. S. AnrYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THa LAW OF CONTRACT 30-39 (4th ed. 1989) (speculating
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individuals to act "reasonably" or may void "unconscionable" contracts;
courts may apply "balancing tests." Indeed, the social model may sometimes
regard rules as less important than relationships. The centuries-old law of
fiduciary duty is the best example in our law of what I have called the
social paradigm. In the law of fiduciary duties, the integrity of relationships
of trust and the protection of dependents by a relatively open-ended,
morality-based fiduciary duty of loyalty have great importance.
In the social model, courts are not solely concerned with building and
maintaining a system of general rules that is justified by its future utility
to private bargainers. Rather, doing justice among the parties to a lawsuit
based upon the very particular facts of the case is seen as a purpose of
adjudication. An adjudication is seen as an end in itself in a sense, not a
heuristic or pedagogic device intended to guide future conduct of others.
The social model therefore may tend towards pragmatism, in the sense that
"just" results are seen as crafted things that result from the responsible
use of all of the available and pertinent materials, but not in any predeter-
mined way. Compared to a liberal positivist, a judge who modeled her
professional actions on the social model would be less afraid to find her
perceptions of the general moral sentiments of the community to be relevant
to her judgment. For such a judge, the law would be a constant working
out of the just solution in a highly particular, but principled way. Except
where legislation excluded all ambiguity, legal rules would be treated as
"general rules" subject to growth and development in future particularized
contexts.
I suppose that the legal value of the highest rank in the social model
is not liberty, but justice, and the bte noire is not suffocation or slavery,
but alienation.
II.
Until rather recently the liberal-utilitarian explanation and prescription
for the social order of our economy did not focus upon what happened (or
what should happen) within corporations. The "market" focus of the
perspective implied that the internal operation of corporate actors was no
more interesting than the internal operation of human actors. In a long
ignored but now famous 1937 article, Ronald Coase for the first time
offered a theory that looked inside the firm. Coase asked why some
transactions are accomplished within firms while others are accomplished
in markets.' This question and Coase's efficiency-based answer to it were
finally taken up by economists in the 1970s, most notably by Armen Alchian
that since 1980 there has been marked re-emergence of classical (liberal-utilitarian in our terms)
contract law).
8. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in R. H.
COASE, THE FrM, Tm MARKET AND THE LAW 33 (1988).
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and Harold Demsetz, 9 Oliver Williamson,10 Michael Jensen and William
Meckling" and others.12 This work re-energized the field of institutional
economics. This scholarship employed two related perspectives-transaction
cost economics and agency cost economics-to generate both a conceptual
account of why firms exist and why they are structured as they are, and a
prescriptive account of how they should function. When applied by legal
scholars to the institutional detail of corporation law, the agency cost
perspective supplied for the first time a unified theory of corporation law.
This work was'carried on by a number of brilliant legal scholars. 3 Perhaps
most prominent in that effort have been Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel, the authors of The Economic Structure of Cor-
porate Law.'
4
The work of the law and economics scholars has come, I believe, to
dominate the academic study of corporate law, even if some of the field's
most respected minds remain among the unconverted. 5 This work has left
academic corporate law far more coherent than it had been and constitutes
a substantial intellectual accomplishment.
9. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 33 J. EcoN.
HisT. 16 (1973).
10. OLIVER E. WILLAMSON, THE EcONONUC INSTITUTIONS OF CAP TALISM (1985); OLIVER
E. Wn.AsoN, MARKETS AND HIERARCHES (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Transacpon-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
11. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
12. E.g., Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem,
in Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economics
Association, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 134-39 (1973); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives and Risk Sharing
in Sharecropping, 41 REV. EcoN. SruDiEs 219 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARv. L. Rav. 1820
(1989); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989);
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications
of Discounted Share Prices as an Acquisiton Motive, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 891 (1988); Jonathan
R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading,
13 Hors-uA L. REV. 9 (1984); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 55 (1991). Easterbrook and Fischel's work is collected in
FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, Tan ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991).
14. EAsTERBROOK & FiSCBEL, supra note 13.
15. I count among the most significant dissenters Professor Victor Brudney and Professor
Melvin Eisenberg. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric
of Contract, 85 CoLTrM. L. REv. 1403 (1985); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 CoLum. L. R.V. 1461 (1989). See also Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections
of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1455, 1467 (1985) (law and economics paradigm not expressly
considered by drafters of Revised Model Business Corporation Act).
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A. Nexus of Contracts
The dominant legal academic view does not describe the corporation as
a social institution. Rather, the corporation is seen as the market writ small,
a web of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between various real persons.
The notion that corporations are "persons" is seen as a weak and unim-
portant fiction. The corporation is regarded as a minor utilitarian invention
designed to reduce the costs necessary to plan, coordinate and accomplish
the complex contracts that large-scale ongoing projects would require.' 6
Since the corporate contract governs an ongoing venture, there is much
that cannot be specified before the relationship among the real persons
involved commences. Thus, a corporation can be seen as a form of relational
contract,17 in which rather large contractual gaps will necessarily exist. The
essence of the corporate form may therefore be seen, on this view, as the
identification of structures or processes by which (1) persons will be desig-
nated to make certain sorts of discretionary judgments; and (2) those so
designated will be monitored. Thus, in the dominant view, a corporation
may be said most fundamentally to be a contractual governance structure.
Corporate law is seen as a way to provide a standard set of instructions
for the operation of such a governance structure. In the corporate charter
much of this standard set can be replaced by terms better suited to the
perceived needs of the parties involved, if that is efficient and desired, but
the cheaper, "off-the-rack" terms set forth in the corporate statute will
often serve well enough. United States corporate law is thus chiefly enabling
in character, not regulatory.' 8
The transaction costs that corporation law can reduce include costs of
negotiation and documentation of the corporate form, but in the dominant
academic vision, most importantly they include other so-called agency costs.
Agency costs are all the costs incurred by a principal by reason of the
utilization of an agent to manage the principal's property. In the nexus of
contracts model, the principals are the residiual risk bearers-shareholders--
and the agents are directors and management. Agency costs include market
rate salaries and other irreducible costs, but more importantly they include
various forms of sub-optimizing behavior by agents. Certain implicit costs,
for example, will arise from a disjunction between the kinds and amounts
of investments made by agents and their principals and the returns available
to each. In addition, shirking, empire-building or venal diversion of cor-
porate property or prospects all constitute agency costs of the corporate
form.
16. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990).
17. Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978).
18. Despite the fact that corporation law statutes in the U.S. are chiefly enabling, these
statutes inevitably do provide for a few nonwaivable terms in the corporate charter, such as
annual meetings to elect directors, stockholder access to books and records in proper circum-
stances, and stockholders' rights to amend the corporation by-laws.
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If is, of course, a simplification to speak of a single economics-inspired
theory of corporations. There is diversity and richness among the econo-
mists, too, running from those most closely associated with a neo-classical
position (such as Michael Jensen, Easterbrook and Fischel) to those whose
micro-analytic techniques and assumptions move them some distance from
the liberal-utilitarian core (such as Williamson). These models, however, all
share a view of persons as "undersocialized,"' 9 self-interested maximizers.
B. The Realist or Institutional Model
Such is the dominance of the nexus of contracts model of the corpo-
ration in the legal academy that this symposium on new directions in
corporate law can be understood only in opposition to this paradigm. One
of the marks of a truly dominant intellectual paradigm is the difficulty
people have in even imagining any alternative view. This is often the case
in the legal academy with respect to the nexus of contracts model of the
corporation. For many corporation law scholars this view is indisputably
correct; its statement is seen as one of fact. Corporations, we are told, do
not really exist; when we refer to one-General Motors or RJR Nabisco,
for example-we are just using a rhetorical shortcut to refer to the vast
network of contracts or implicit contracts that is the "reality."
There is, of course, force in this position.2 But, as my simplistic analysis
suggests, another view of corporations is possible. In opposition to the
philosophical nominalism of economics stands the philosophical realism of
sociology. To the philosophical realist, to call a corporation a network of
contracts is to overlook an essential part of the empirical reality of social
interactions "within" corporations. It implies that the circumstances that
any participant in the enterprise may confront at any moment are fully
accounted for by reference to one or more earlier negotiated (or implicit)
bargains he or she made. This, to realists, is a palpably impoverished way
to interpret much of what goes on within corporations. Contract, for
example, can provide only a thin and weak account of the experience of
long-term stockholders of a large public corporation that has recently started
paying grossly excessive compensation to its senior management; or whose
management wants to deploy a newly created "poison pill" to foreclose a
hostile tender offer. Or consider an instance in which employees work
especially diligently in order that a team, department or division can reach
a production goal. It very plausibly could be the case that contract would
provide only a very partial and inadequate explanation of their behavior.
2
1
19. Dennis Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, 26 Am.
Soc. REv. 183 (1961).
20. One is reminded that Jeremy Bentham similarly held that "the community is a
fictitious body, composed of ... individual persons." JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUcTION
TO THE PRINCIP.ES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (Basil Blackwell ed., 1948), quoted in AIrrTA
EThoaM, THE MORAL DIMmNSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 6 (1988).
21. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, in EMcIENcY
WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR NM 66 (George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yelen eds., 1986).
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On" the realist view corporations can be, indeed inevitably are, more
than contracts. Actual bargains, explicit or implicit, provide an incomplete
account of the social order we find in organizations. That social order can
exist only because contracts are embedded in a social context that permits
trust and expectations of fair dealing.3
More than a network of contracts, corporations are seen by realists as
collective entities that have identities apart from those of any of the
individuals who temporarily fill roles within them. The history of such an
institution, the "culture" and values it comes to embody and the institutional
goals it formally and informally moves toward affect in every sense (legal,
social or economic) the relationships among those who participate in the
corporate enterprise. Such an institution to succeed over time must employ
learning (about markets, about technology, about organization and about
improving human skills). It must create and sustain an evolving capacity to
learn to recall, to plan and to coordinate action. Achievement of corporate
goals may depend importantly on the trust and loyalty of the human actors
involved in circumstances in which monitoring and incentives are difficult
and costly to establish and implement.23
The provision of pre-defined roles and rules in the ongoing organization
and the social-psychological processes of identification that successful or-
ganizations promote are seen by some as vital components of economic
organizations that simply are not visible to the "network of contracts"
vision of the firm. When Judge Easterbrook and'Professor Fischel, for
example, state that "[elverything to do with the relation between the firm
and the suppliers of labor . .. is contractual," they underline the word
"[e]verything.'' 24 Those who tend towards the social model of human
behavior see this sort of description of corporations as brittle, partial and
flawed.
Some of those who hold a social or realist perspective tend normatively
to be concerned with a corrosive effect that interpreting social life as a
continuous, self-interested negotiation may have. Thus they do not accept
the assertion that corporate management owes a duty to exercise discretion
so as to maximize financial returns to stockholders.2S Rather, they look for
ways in which workers can participate in firm governance and thus gain a
greater sense of the meaning of community membership. Perhaps inciden-
tally, it is sometimes urged that steps that will increase worker engagement
and responsibility will also increase corporate productivity.
22. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481, 490-93 (1985).
23. See Herbert A. Simon, Organizations and Markets, J. EcON. PERSP., Spring 1991,
at 25, 34-38.
24. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 13, at 16.
25. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:




Seeing the business corporation as a social institution can supply justi-
fication for a variety of organizational forms that differ from the share
value maximization model promoted by the dominant academic conception
of the corporation. The social model, in one of its weaker forms, is highly
consisfent with the managerialist concept of the corporation that has, in
fact, dominated the real world of business and politics since the great
depression.2 That view sees senior management as empowered to give fair
consideration to workers, communities, and suppliers as well as to suppliers
of capital. The statutory law in more than half of the U.S. jurisdictions
has arguably come to reflect the managerialist concept of the corporation. 27
Equally evidently the social model of philosophical realists is consistent
with various forms of worker involvement in management, such as may
accompany an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), and with worker
representation, such as is present in the German co-determination structure.
At its most extreme, this conception may yield more "radical" forms of
corporate organizations, such as the kibbutz or other worker communes.
III.
Many corporation law issues do not, of course, penetrate the dense
superstructure of the field to reach the level of philosophical disagreement.
Think of the issues in an appraisal proceeding, for example. From the host
of technical questions relating to whether a right to an appraisal has been
duly exercised, to the financial issues of "fair price," one's view of the
meaning of human social life simply doesn't enter into the matter. Or
consider the corporation law issues involved in that most common of all
legal opinions, that a corporation is validly organized and in good standing,
or an opinion that an act has been duly authorized by effective board
action. In resolving such questions, formality, not contestable assertions of
social meaning, is critical. Similarly, the experienced legal practitioner
expects questions concerning the validity of by-laws, the need for a class
vote, the rights of preferred stock, the proper way to count the vote at an
election, and a host of other technical corporation law questions to be
decided as matters of form according to clear pre-existing rules.
It is when the directors' duty of loyalty is properly called into issue
that the corporate law may tend to cast off its heavy reliance upon formality
to look beneath the surface of things. It is the concept of loyalty, which
necessarily is grounded in the moral order of some community, that most
evidently introduces into corporation law the dichotomy that I have men-
26. See Edward S. Mason, Introduction to THm CORPORaION IN MODERN SocIErY 1
(1959); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARtozo L. Rav. 261, 270 (1992).
27. See Symposium, Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STEr-
SON L. REv. 1 (1991); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 14, 16 (1992); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination
of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 89, 91 (1990).
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tioned: between a positivistic, utilitarian, rules-bound worldview on one
hand and a flexible, moralistic one on the other. Fiduciary duty claims are
equitable in origin. They tend to be analyzed in a particularistic ex post
style. Their evaluation entails a moral account or prescription for a dispute
that is in its own terms independent of, and sometimes inconsistent with,
the positivistic, ex ante style of the liberal-utilitarian approach.
Large parts of the fabric of our corporation law have been woven on
the loom of equity. In his classic article, Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust,2 Professor Berle, for example, demonstrated the early origin of the
doctrine of stockholder preemptive rights in the equitable powers of chan-
cery. In Speiser v. Bakea9 I had the occasion to trace back the equity cases
from which evolved the statutory prohibition on a corporation voting its
own stock.30 In fact, in every corporation law case in which the gist of the
complaint is a breach of loyalty-in every case involving self-dealing by a
controlling shareholder 31 or involving any manipulation of the voting proc-
ess,32 for example-compliance with the more or less clear technical rules
of corporation law is not the determinative issue. A contestable judgment
about fairness-the historic mission of chancery-is.
Thus, fiduciary duties, pre-eminently the duty of loyalty, introduce
tension .and ambiguity into corporation law. It is when questions of loyalty
are at issue that the philosophical differences that I have mentioned begin
to appear near the surface, visible to even judges and lawyers in practice.
Most especially is this true, as the experience of the 1980s demonstrated,
when the question of fiduciary duty arises in connection with a proposed
sale of a company. One of the things that was so remarkable about that
period in corporation law was the way in which deep philosophical conflict
concerning the purpose of corporations and political questions concerning
our commitment to the values of the liberal economy were forced to the
surface. In that setting, the philosophical divergence between the liberal
model and the social model did not appear ethereal or academic but vital.
IV.
The law and economics paradigm offers a highly coherent conception
of corporation law as a system of rules facilitating wealth maximization
28. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049,
1055-57 (1931).
29. 525 A.2d 1001 (Del. Ch. 1987).
30. Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001, 1007-11 (Del. Ch. 1987); see Ex parte Holmes, 5
Cow. 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
31. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (discussing elimination of
minority shareholders via merger between corporation and its majority owner); Jones v. H.
F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 469 (Cal. 1969).
32. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (considering petition
of stockholders for injunction to prevent management from advancing date of annual share-
holders' meeting); Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(examining validity of board's adding two new members to board to prevent holders of
majority of stock from replacing majority of board via consent solicitation); Aprahamian v.
HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987) (discussing attempt of parties seeking election to
corporate board to enjoin postponement of annual meeting).
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through contracts, explicit or implicit. This is, to a substantial extent, an
idealized version of the corporation law in action. Like much of neo-
classical economics, the law and economics account of corporation law is
at bottom not empirical description, but normative prescription. It means
to tell us how people would act with respect to formation of legal rules
concerning corporations if people acted rationally (as they sometimes, if
imperfectly, do). It thus means to create an ideal corporation law to guide
those who fill in "contractual gaps" to act rationally when they do so. I
suppose that even those who prefer to think about life as a world of
complete markets drifting in and out of equilibrium do not believe that in
fact people always do act rationally. But that recognition does not, of
course, mean that the law should not take rationality as a standard. It is
the further step taken by the law and economics theorists, their attempts
to forge an equivalence between rationality and profit maximization, that
does give rise to warm disagreement.
The idealized law and economics version of corporation law makes a
tremendous contribution to our understanding of the nature of the firm,
but it is not complete. My own understanding, which is, I confess, incom-
plete as well, acknowledges the power and utility of much of the law and
economics story, but recognizes as well the pressures on rule-creating agen-
cies to view corporate directors as men and women with obligations of
loyalty which will be evaluated ex post on a fairness standard. Courts have
felt and responded to these pressures for over two hundred years. To whom
director duties of loyalty are owed can and has sustained earnest debate in
legislative chambers, in the press, and in the academy. Thus, either a
descriptive account or a normative account of corporation law that I might
advance would include a powerful element of wealth maximization, but it
would inescapably include as well a political-moral component. Corporation
law is a system of rules, principles and roles and a process by which they
are defined, redefined in legally significant interactions, and enforced. In
that process the law, or legal agents, mediate, pursuant to the processes of
law, between the wealth maximizing value and the ex ante analytical style
of the liberal model and the fairness value and the ex post analytical style
of equity.33 I offer no theory to explain that mediation here.
Turning from the world of theory to the world of action and events,
this symposium seeks to raise the question whether fundamental change in
corporate law is at hand. While I of course acknowledge that the political
processes have enacted stakeholder statutes across the country, nevertheless,
I think I also see popular acceptance of the assertion that all systems of
corporate governance that take the social nature of the firm seriously are
subject to threats of inadequate accountability and inefficiency. It is also
widely understood, I think, that there are in the world powerful economic
and technological forces that are forcing corporations towards greater
efficiency. These forces include the re-aggregation of shareholders in insti-
tutional investors and the emergence of the global economy.
33. See supra note 6.
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Both phenomena are highly significant for American corporations.
Today throughout the world, business corporations must operate in increas-
ingly competitive markets. To survive in such markets, it seems accepted
that the performance of the organization needs to be intelligently monitored.
But there does not appear to be an easy or clear way in principle to evaluate
the performance of those in charge of the deployment of corporate assets,
if their duty is to balance the claims made upon the corporation by a variety
of contesting claimants. Equally problematic for many (including Professor
Stephen M. Bainbridge in this volume) is the possibility that this lack of a
standard of accountability may be conducive to self-interested manipulation
of the corporation by those who are placed in control of it. Thus, from a
practical point of view, the special problems which would face a business
organization operating in a legal regime consistent with the social model--
or at least a large-scale organization operating in such a regime-do not
appear easy to solve.
In the United States the liberal-utilitarian account of and prescription
for corporate law is the dominant legal academic model and will remain so
for some time. The coherence and power of the economic model, as it is
applied to corporations, have for many an all but irresistible appeal.
Moreover, in our pluralistic society, it may be especially difficult to for-
mulate any alternative comprehensive theory of corporations that takes its
animating power from a conception of human connectedness and respon-
sibility. Finally, in an age of global competition and fading expectations,
the plausible claims of greater efficiency (wealth maximization) that the
nexus of contracts theory makes also render this way of thinking powerfully
attractive. Indeed, so powerful and pervasive are our concerns about global
competitiveness that a more realistic and complex conception of corporations
and corporate law could successfully be advanced only if it were premised
on a plausible claim that such a model could lead to more productive
organizations in utilitarian terms.
Thus, while tensions arising from the fundamental divergence between
self and community will continue in our corporation law, as elsewhere, my
own supposition is that in the immediate future tentative resolution of this
tension will not be worked out in a substantially different way than it has
been in the past. But while I therefore doubt that we have yet come to a
turn in the road of corporate law, it does not follow that it is not important
for some academics to test and challenge the dominant paradigm and
especially to try to broaden the base of social science data and theory that
informs academic corporation law. The social sciences that attempt to
grapple with the complexity, ambiguity and contradictions of rounded
human actors in real life will probably be more difficult for legal academics
constructively to employ than neo-classical economics has been, but some
bridge-builders should be working on those spans now.Y The papers reported
34. Professors James D. Cox and Hairry L. Munsinger's outstanding 1985 piece, Bias in
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here and the work to which they refer offer hope to those who would
welcome the articulation of legal theories of the corporation, and rules and
principles of its governance, that take into account the complexity and
contradictions contained within these organizations.
the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion,
LAW & Comp. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, is an encouraging example of what can be done.
See also HANDBOOK OF EcoNmOc SOCIOLOGY (Neil Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., forth-
coming).
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